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INTRODUCTION
Official Comment 1 to Section 2-401 of the Uniform Commercial
Code explains that the rules set forth in the section for determining
when title passes "in no way alter the rights of either the buyer, seller
or third parties declared elsewhere in the Article ...." The title rules
are said to be stated "in case the courts deem any public regulation to
incorporate the defined term of the 'private' law." Thus, the imposition
of a sales tax, an income tax or a property tax may depend on the
passage of title but not, according to the comment, the rights of buyer
against seller or vice versa.
This article has a twofold purpose. First, it will attempt to set out
the rights of a party to a sales transaction in obtaining possession of
the goods where they are in the hands of the other party to the trans-
action, a carrier or other third party. Second, it will attempt to dispel
the myth created by the comment that the Code has eliminated the
concept of title as a method of determining rights and remedies of
parties to a sales transaction. The article is organized for achievement
of the first purpose. Within that organization, however, the concept of
* Ph.B., University of Chicago, 1948; JD., University of Chicago, 1954; Member,
Illinois Bar and The American and Maryland Bar Associations; Associate Professor of
Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
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title will suggest itself repeatedly as the most available tool for solution
of the problems that arise.
I. GOODS IN TRANSIT: POSSESSORY LIENS
Under the Uniform Sales Act, the buyer who has rejected goods,
but still retained possession, had a lien to secure any part of the pur-
chase price paid' The Code provisions are similar.' Where the unpaid
seller retained possession, but the property interest had passed to the
buyer, the seller had under the U.S.A. a "right to retain [the goods]
for the price."' In case of the buyer's insolvency, the seller had the
right to retain possession,' or, if they had been shipped, to stop the
goods in transit 5 The Code provisions again are similar.° The unlim-
ited right of a seller to reserve the right to possession by retaining title,
despite delivery to the buyer, given by U.S.A. Section 20(1), was re-
stricted by the however, and the seller now must file a financ-
ing statement to prevail against third parties.'
The buyer has the right to replevy goods identified to the contract
"if the goods have been shipped under reservation, and satisfaction of
the security interest in them has been made or tendered."' A fortiori,
the buyer must have the right to replevy goods which have been shipped
without reservation.
While the goods are in transit under a non-negotiable bill of lading,
even though title has passed, the seller has the power to regain posses-
sion or divert the shipment .° The seller might divert the buyer's goods
to a second purchaser, or a receiver in bankruptcy of the seller might
recapture the goods. The clear implication from section 2-716(3) is that
the buyer should prevail over both the second purchaser and over a
lien creditor or trustee in bankruptcy of the seller.' If the seller wrong-
fully regains possession of the goods and delivers them to a second
buyer, it may be that the second buyer will lose even if he is a buyer
in ordinary course within section 2-403(2). The first buyer has not
"entrusted" his goods to the seller.
It can be argued that the buyer's right is limited by the term re-
plevin, which imports a title right. However, the buyer's right to goods
in transit may even extend to goods shipped under an FOB delivery
1 Uniform Sales Act § 69(5) (act withdrawn 1962) [hereinafter cited as U.S.A.].
2 U.C.C. § 2-711(3). Unless otherwise indicated all Uniform Commercial Code refer-
ences are to the 1962 Official Text.
3 U.S.A. § 53(1)(2).
4 U.S.A. § 54(1) (c).
5 U.S.A. § 53 (1) (b).
6 U.C.C. §§ 2-702(1), -703, -705.
7 	§§ 1-201(37), 9-113, -301, -312.
8 U.C.C. § 2-716(3).
9 U.C.C.	 7-303 (1) (b).
10 Cf. Adkins v. Damron, 324 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1959) (prior law).
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point contract, where he would not have the title. Section 2-716(3)
makes no distinction based on the shipping term, and in part at least
allows replevin based on a special property interest rather than title.
In a common trust receipt transaction, the financing agency may pay
against a non-negotiable bill of lading and assume that it has a security
interest in the goods because the buyer "has acquired rights in the col-
lateral." Tithe buyer acquires no rights unless title to the goods has
passed to him, then the financing agency would not have a security in-
terest in goods in transit under an FOB delivery point contract, and an
intervening lien creditor of the seller would prevail. Validation of trust
receipt financing would thus supply one policy reason for giving the
buyer rights in the goods in transit regardless of title. This argument,
however, is probably adequately met by the argument that the financing
agency can see that the buyer has title before it pays the price. A better
answer is that a debtor-buyer's rights in goods by reason of identifi-
cation to the contract are sufficient to support a security interest.
The seller's trustee in bankruptcty would have an additional argu-
ment that his right to reject executory contracts prevails over the buy-
er's state law right to possession.' Just what are executory contracts
which the trustee in bankruptcy can reject is not clear, but the better
view would be that if the bankrupt seller had fully performed and title
has passed, the transaction is no longer executory within the purpose
of Section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act to allow the trustee to reject
burdensome property.
II. RIGHTS OF A SELLER NOT HAVING POSSESSION
Once the seller has parted with possession of the goods and has
lost his right to stop in transit there are five possible theories under
which he can establish a right to possession: (1) enforcement of a
security interest; (2) common law replevin; (3) reclamation under
section 2-507 if the sale is for cash; (4) common law rescission based
on fraud; and (5) reclamation under section 2-702 if the buyer is in-
solvent. This section will examine each of these theories to establish
the scope of the seller's right to obtain possession. Particular emphasis
will be placed on the ability of the seller to enforce his right to pos-
session against third party claimants.
A. Security Interest
If there is an agreement that the seller retain a security interest
in the goods, this agreement is enforceable against the buyer. If the
buyer should default on the security agreement, the seller can take
possession of the goods.' If the security interest is perfected under
It Bankruptcy Act § 70,11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1964).
12 U.C.C. § 9-503.
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Article 9," it can be enforced by the seller against subsequent lien
creditors of the buyer" or against subsequent good faith purchasers
other than buyers in the ordinary course of business." Regardless,
perfection of the security interest is not enforceable against a subse-
quent buyer in the ordinary course of business."
B. Replevin
In order to maintain a common law replevin action for return of
the goods, the seller must retain title." There are a number of types
of transactions in which the seller might retain title. The first is the
conditional sales transaction where the seller retains title as security
for the payment of the price." The remaining two types of transactions,
the sale or return and the sale on approval, share a common character-
istic in addition to the seller's retention of title—the buyer may return
the goods even though they conform to the contract for sale. In the
sale or return, the seller puts the goods in the hands of the buyer so
that he may resell them." In the sale on approval, the seller delivers
the goods to the buyer primarily for use by the buyer.'
The seller's right to possession in a transaction where title is re-
tained for security is governed by section 2-401(1). This section pro-
vides that any retention by the seller of title in the goods shipped to
the buyer is limited to a security interest?' Therefore, at least as to
this type of title reservation transaction, replevin against the buyer
is not available to the seller as a theory distinguishable from enforce-
ment of a security interest.
Although section 2-401(1) is also applicable to each of the other
two categories, the effect of the section is circumscribed by the provi-
sions of section 2-326. Under this section, goods held by a buyer "on
approval" are not subject to the claims of the buyer's creditors until
they are accepted by the buyer. 22 A s a result, a seller reclaiming the
goods before acceptance would defeat the claim of a subsequent creditor
of the buyer even though the creditor had no knowledge of any con-
13 The rules of perfection are contained in U.C.C. §§ 9-302, -305.
14 See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, -302(1) (b).
15 See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, -301(1) (c). There is one exception to this rule. A buyer of
consumer goods or farm equipment worth less than $2500 takes free of a perfected secu-
rity interest if he buys "for his own personal, family or household purposes or his own
farming operations" without knowledge of the security interest unless the secured party
has filed. U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
16 	§ 9-307(1).
17 See Hannibal inv. Co. v. Schmidt, 113 S.W.2d 1048 (Mo. App. 1938) .
15 See Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 1 (act withdrawn 1943).
75 	§ 2-326 (1) (b).
20
	 § 2-326(1) (a).
21 See also U.C.C. § 1-201(37). But cf. San Diego Wholesale Credit Men's Ass'n v.
Garner, 325 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1963).
22 	§ 2-326(2).
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flitting claims in the goods. The seller, however, would not be able to
obtain possession from a subsequent purchaser of the goods. The sale
by the buyer would constitute an acceptance and, therefore, the seller
would have to enforce any rights he might have against the buyer. A
more difficult situation arises if the resale by the buyer is made after
a rightful demand by the seller for return of the goods. Even in that
situation, however, it is doubtful that the seller can exercise his right
against the purchaser. Since section 2-326 does not provide for seller's
rights against subsequent purchasers, these rights would be governed
by the section 2-401(1) provision that retention of title is limited to
a security interest. This interest can be enforced against the purchaser
only if the seller takes the steps to perfect under Article 9.
Under section 2-326, the "sale or return" is treated very nearly as
it would be if section 2-401(1) alone were determinative. Section 2-326
expressly provides that the goods are subject to the claims of the buy-
er's creditors once they are in the hands of the buyer." Theref ore, the
seller's right to replevin can always be defeated by a lien creditor." In
addition, it is clear that, as in the "sale on approval," the seller cannot
exercise replevin against the subsequent purchasers.
C. Reclamation Under Section 2-507
Under section 2-507, when delivery of goods or documents of title
is made and payment is due, the buyer's right to retain or dispose of
the goods is conditioned upon his making that payment. Thus, when
the delivery is conditional on payment in cash and the cash is not paid,
the seller should be able to reclaim the goods. Since section 2-511(3)
provides that "payment by check is conditional and is defeated as be-
tween the parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment," the
seller should also be able to reclaim if he is paid with a check that is
later dishonored.
Section 2-507 defines only the rights of the seller against the buyer.
Since the section does not mention the seller's rights against other
claimants, such as a good faith purchaser or attaching creditor, it may
be read that the seller has no rights against these claimants. Another
section of the Code shows that this interpretation of 2-507 reaches the
proper result with respect to a subsequent good faith purchaser, even
23 Id. It has been held that section 2-326(2) does not apply in "bona fide consign-
ment" transactions. In re Mincow Bag Co., 53 Misc. 2d 599, 279 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct.
1967).
24 See U.C.C. § 2-326(3) which deals with consignment transactions. It provides
that where goods are delivered to a person for sale and that person maintains a place of
business where he deals in roods of the kind involved, then the goods arc deemed to be
on sale or return with respect to the creditors of the person receiving the goods. This rule
applies even if the goods are delivered to an agent who is a dealer of goods of the kind
involved. General Elec. Co. v. Pettingell Supply Co., 347 Mass. 631, 199 N.E.2d 326 (1964).
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though the buyer received delivery in a cash sale or in exchange for a
check that was later dishonored.'
Reading into the silence of 2-507 an intent to subordinate the
seller's reclamation right to the rights of subsequent claimants is more
difficult when the subsequent claimant is a lien creditor. Prior to the
Code, creditors have usually been given no greater rights than their
debtors. 2° If this policy is read in section 2-507, the rights given the
seller against the buyer are also enforceable against the lien creditor.
One court has adopted this approach and found that a seller could re-
claim under 2-507 and cut off the interest of the lien creditor."
D. Reclamation Under Section 2-702
Section 2-702 (3) provides:
The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is sub-
ject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good
faith purchaser or lien creditor under this Article (Section
2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other
remedies with respect to them.
The rights of the seller against the buyer as defined by section 2-702(2)
are clear from the section. With less clarity, however, section 2-702(3)
attempts to define, at least in part, the relationship of these reclamation
rights to third party claimants. The 1966 version of 2-702(3) provides
that "the seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to
rights of a buyer in the ordinary course or other good faith purchaser
under this article (section 2-403)." This subsection will analyze in
depth the seller's right to reclaim against subsequent purchasers and
lien creditors with emphasis on a claimant that presents unique prob-
lems, the trustee in bankruptcy.'
A subsequent buyer in ordinary course or other good faith pur-
chaser can defeat a seller's attempt to reclaim only if he can establish
a right to possession under Article 2 that conflicts with the seller's
reclamation right. Section 2-702(3) refers to section 2-403 for the
rights of the good faith purchaser. Section 2-403 provides: "A person
with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith
purchaser for value." In treating transactions between a buyer and his
subsequent purchaser, it goes on to provide that "[w]hen goods have
been delivered under a transaction of purchase" the original buyer has
25 U.C.C. 2 -403(1)(h), (c).
26 See I G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences § 19, at 36-37 (rev. ed.
1940) [hereinafter cited as Glenn].
27 See In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309 (ED. Pa. 1962). But see Shanker, A Reply
to the Proposed Amendment of U.C.C. Section 2-702(3): Another View of Lien Creditor's
Rights vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 W. Res. L. Rev. 93 (1962).
28 Other claimants such as a repairman or the Internal Revenue Service could arise,
but their relative rights will not be discussed.
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the power to transfer even though he acquired such title through certain
enumerated fraudulent practices.
It is clear that where the buyer receives goods on credit while in-
solvent he acquires title voidable by the seller's 2-702 reclamation right.
Therefore, under section 2-403, the buyer has power to transfer good
title to the subsequent good faith purchaser for value. As between a
buyer and a subsequent purchaser from him, however, section 2-403
goes on to give the power to transfer good title to the buyer only when
there has been a delivery of the goods to the original buyer. The use
of the term "delivery" suggests that the buyer must have possession in
addition to title to transfer good title to a subsequent good faith pur-
chaser.
The term "delivery" is not defined in the Code, but section 2-
503 (1) provides that "tender of delivery requires that the seller put
and hold conforming goods at the buyer's disposition and give the buyer
any notification reasonably necessary to enable him to take delivery."
Delivery is also normally determinative of passage of title under section
2-401: "Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the
time and place at which the seller completes his performance with refer-
ence to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of
a security interest . . ." Although both sections 2-403(1) and 2-401
imply that the buyer must somehow take possession for delivery to
occur, it is not clear that this concept of delivery was intended in sec-
tion 2-403. Section 2-401 is a title section. It provides that, absent a
contrary agreement, title passes on tender of delivery. It is possible
that in some cases, for example where seller's delivery occurs at his
place of business, the buyer will get title without possession under sec-
tion 2-401. Since section 2-403(1) also provides rules for passage of
title, it is probable that "delivery" as used in 2-403 is identical to tender
of delivery under 2-401. Under this interpretation the presence of the
wording "when goods have been delivered under a transaction of pur-
chase" can be explained as a reference to when the buyer obtains the
title that he is attempting to transfer.
If the above analysis is accepted, the buyer has the power to trans-
fer title to the goods to a subsequent good faith purchaser and, thus,
cut off the seller's reclamation right even though the seller retains pos-
session. This situation, where delivery occurs without the seller's losing
possession, would, of course, be rare. Also the seller would still have
some protection since he would retain a superior claim for the price,
which the second buyer would have to satisfy before he could recover
the goods. If the goods were in transit at the time the buyer transferred
to the subsequent purchaser, however, the seller would lose this right
to the price once the goods are received by the buyer or subsequent
purchaser.
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The lack of clarity in section 2-403 as to whether the buyer must
have possession to defeat the reclaiming seller is also present with
respect to the subsequent good faith purchaser. Section 2-403 gives the
buyer the power to transfer title to the subsequent good faith purchaser,
but neither section 2-403 nor 2-702 provides that title in the subsequent
good faith purchaser alone will defeat the seller's right to reclaim. This
ambiguity can be resolved by examination of the prior law.
Under Section 24 of the Uniform Sales Act, when the seller of
goods Ms voidable title and this title is not avoided before sale of the
goods, a good faith purchaser for value acquires good title. This section
has been uniformly interpreted as giving the subsequent purchaser the
right to defeat a rescission by the original seller, even though the
subsequent purchaser did not have possession, unless the original
seller rescinded before the subsequent purchaser obtained title.29
The wording of Section 2-403 of the Code is sufficiently similar so that
it should be interpreted in the same manner. 3° This interpretation is
supported also by the definition of purchase in section 1-201(32).
Under this section, purchase includes taking an interest in property by
mortgage or lien. In these transactions a third party obtains an interest
in property, but he does not obtain possession."' Therefore, since pos-
session is not necessary to a "purchase" under 1-201(32), it should
not be necessary to a "purchase" under 2-403.
There is additional ambiguity in the prerequisites to defeat of the
reclaiming seller by the subsequent purchaser. It is clear that the sub-
sequent purchaser must give value. Both the Sales Act and the Code
include within the definition of value the satisfaction of a prior debt or
claim.32 Under the Sales Act, however, the courts continued to follow
23 The cases under this section held that the subsequent buyer's right to defeat the
rescinding seller depended on the buyer's having technical title. See Pingleton v. Shepherd,
219 Ark. 473, 242 S.W.2d 971 (1951); Keegan v. Kaufman Bros., 68 Cal. App. 2d 197,
156 P.2d 261 (1945) ; Woonsocket Rubber Co. v. Loewenburg, 17 Wash. 29, 48 P. 785
(1897). In addition, in instances where the subsequent buyer had possession without title,
he could prevail over the rescinding seller if he could show that the seller was estopped
from denying his title. See, e.g., Handey Motor Co. v. Wood, 238 N.C. 468, 78 S.E.2d 391
(1953); Keegan v. Lenzie, 171 Ore. 194, 135 P.2d 717 (1943). One line of these estoppel
cases dealt with entrusting goods to a merchant. See, e.g., Meadows v. Hampton Live
Stock Comm. Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 634, 131 P.2d 591 (1942). The Code adopted the rule
of this line of cases in section 2-403(2). It may also be interpreted as adopting the rule
of all of these estoppel cases since the law of estoppel is not displaced by the Code. U.C.C.
§ 1-103.
30 See Metropolitan Distribs. v. Eastern Supply Co., 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 128 (C.P.
1959). But cf. Hudiberg Chevrolet, Inc. v. Ponce, 17 Wis. 2d 281, 116 N.W.2d 252 (1962)
where the court held that a good faith purchaser won despite the original seller's prior
attempts to rescind or reclaim on the ground that the check which the seller received from
the buyer did not clear.
31 If the subsequent purchaser is a secured party, there does not even seem to be the
requirement that he perfect his security interest under Article 9. Cf. Main Inv. Co. v.
Gisolfi, 203 Pa. Super. 244, 199 A.2d 535 (1964).
32 U.S.A. § 76; U.C.C. § 1-201(44).
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the common law rule that a seller's right to rescind could not be cut
off by a sale in consideration for release of an antecedent indebtedness
despite the Act's contrary definition.33 The common law rule might be
continued under the Code even though the Code has a contrary defini-
tion of "value" on the theory that the context of section 2-403 is akin
to estoppel and the section 1-201 definition of "value" is not applicable.
Acceptance of such a theory would have ramifications beyond the prior
indebtedness question. At common law a purchaser who has only prom-
ised to pay could not be a good faith purchaser " Under the Code's
definition of value, the credit purchaser can be a good faith purchaser
for value." If this definition of value does not apply to section 2-403,
however, the common law rule might still be the law. 3°
From the above analysis, the rights of the reclaiming seller against
a subsequent purchaser can be seen to turn almost exclusively on title.
Once the original buyer obtains title, he has the power by transfer to a
subsequent good faith purchaser to cut off the seller's reclamation right.
Likewise, once the subsequent good faith purchaser obtains title, he
may cut off the seller's rights. This passage of title from seller to buyer
to subsequent purchaser may, in fact, occur without the seller ever
losing possession of the goods.
Under the 1966 version of section 2-702, the rights of a reclaiming
seller against a subsequent lien creditor are easily defined. Section
2-702(3) expressly states that "the seller's right is subject to the rights
of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser" under
Article 2. Section 2-702(3) does not subject the seller's reclamation
right to the rights of a lien creditor. This ommission might be ambigu-
ous but for the statutory history and comments which make it clear
that the ommission of the lien creditor in 2-702(3) is intended to mean
that the lien creditor cannot defeat the rights of the reclaiming seller."
Because only California has adopted the 1966 version of 2-
702 (31, 38 it is necessary to consider the earlier version of the Code for
33 See Smith v. Autocar Sales & Serv. Co., 107 Ind. App. 244, 20 N.E.2d 188 (1939) ;
Automobile Equip. Co. v. Motor Bankers Corp., 251 Mich. 220, 231 N.W. 559 (1930).
See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R. 488 (1926).
34 See, e.g., Schloss v. Feltus, 96 Mich. 619, 55 N.W. 1010 (1893).
33 U.C.C. 1-201(44).
96 See G. G. Bogert & G. T. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 887 at 154 (2d ed. 1960),
[hereinafter cited as Bogert], in which it is assumed that the common law definition of
value is inapplicable under the Code.
37 See Report No. 3 of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code 3 (1966).
38 Cal. Comm. Code § 2701(3) .(West 1964). In addition, twelve states have deleted
the words "or lien creditor" from section 2-702(3). See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-2-702(3)
(Cum. Pocket Part 1967); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42a-2-702(3) (Cum. Pocket Part
1968); III. Ann. Stat. ch. 26 § 2-702(3) (Smith-Hurd 1963) ; Kans. Stat. Ann. § 84-2-702
(Cum. Pocket Part 1967) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 2-702(3) (1964); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 12A: 2-702(3) (Cum. Pocket Part 1967); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-2-702(3) (1962);
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a complete analysis of the seller's reclamation rights against lien cred-
itors. The earlier version of 2-702(3) stated that the seller's reclama-
tion right was subject to the rights of a lien creditor under Article 2.
Unfortunately the term "lien creditor" is not defined either in Article
2 or Article 1. In addition, there is no provision in the Code stating
what the rights of a lien creditor are under Article 2.
Although the term "lien creditor" is not defined in Articles 2 or 1,
it is defined in section 9-301 as including a creditor who has obtained
a lien by attachment or levy, an assignee for the benefit of creditors,
and a trustee in bankruptcy. It is generally assumed that this definition
may be used for purposes of section 2-702. Although such a conclusion
is not mandatory, since the use of the definition does not conflict with
any section or policy of Article 2, it would appear to be both necessary
and proper to use it.
There are a number of possible interpretations of the words "rights
of a lien creditor" under Article 2. Professor Shanker" has argued that
the rights of lien creditors under Article 2 can be found in section
2-326(3):
(3) Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and
such person maintains a place of business at which he deals in
goods of the kind involved, under a name other than the name
of the person making delivery, then with respect to claims of
creditors of the person conducting the business the goods are
deemed to be on sale or return.
Under subsection (2), when goods are held by the buyer on sale or
return they are subject to the claims of the buyer's creditors. Taken
literally and without regard to the context, therefore, section 2-326(3)
gives certain rights to lien creditors.
It is a long step, however, to say that because section 2-326 gives
rights to lien creditors these are the rights that are stated in section
2-702. Section 2-326 deals with certain types of title reservation trans-
actions. The second sentence of subsection (3) states: "The provisions
of this subsection are applicable even though an agreement purports
to reserve title to the person making delivery until payment or resale
or uses such words as 'on consignment' or 'on memorandum'." Viewed
in this context, the intent of subsection (3) is most likely to treat goods
held by a buyer without title on the same footing as goods held with
title in some situations. That is, the creditor of the buyer can reach
these goods regardless of the seller's title. Because of its limited appli-
N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (McKinney 1964); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-702(3) (Cum. Pocket
Part 1967); N.D. Cent. Code § 41-02-81-3 (1968) ; Tex. Bus. and Comm. Code Ann.
§ 2.702(c) (1968); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-702(3) (Cum. Pocket Part 1967).
39 Shanker, supra note 27.
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cation, it is unlikely that this provision was intended to displace seller's
rights to reclaim under section 2-702. This limited interpretation of
section 2-326(3) is supported by the comment to the section, which
states subsection (3) "resolves all reasonable doubts as to the nature
of the transaction in favor of the general creditors of the buyer!"4°
(Emphasis added.)
Another possible interpretation of the rights of a lien creditor
under Article 2 is that they are the same as the rights of the lien cred-
itor under Article 9. This argument is supported by the reference in
section 2-702(3) to section 2-403. Section 2-403 states that the rights
of lien creditors "are governed by the Article on Secured Transactions
(Article 9)." Since under section 9-301 lien creditors have priority over
unperfected security interests, the result of this argument is to subject
the reclaiming seller to the claims of creditors if the seller's reclama-
tion right is an unperfected security interest. If the right to reclaim is a
security interest, it would have to be filed to be perfected.
Adopting the Article 9 provisions on the rights of lien creditors
raises both conceptual and practical difficulties. "Security interest" is
defined in section 1-207(37) as an "interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." Only
if the meaning of securing "performance of an obligation" is stretched,
can a reclamation right be found to be a security interest.41 Even if the
right to reclaim can be made to fit within the 1-201(37) definition,
however, the whole context of Article 9 inclines against such a fit.
Security interests under Article 9 are the result of consensual trans-
actions,' whereas the right to reclaim is created without the parties
ever intending to create a property interest. Also, as a practical matter,
since under section 9-113 security interests arising under Article 2 must
be filed if the debtor has possession of the goods, characterization of
the right to reclaim as a security interest will mean that the seller will
always lose to a subsequent lien creditor. The seller will never have the
requisite signed financing statement nor will he have time to file.
Since section 2-702(3) mentions rights of a lien creditor but no-
where defines them, it is possible to interpret the section as giving the
lien creditor the right to defeat the reclaiming seller in all instances.
Such an interpretation, however, would nullify section 2-702(2) with-
out expressly stating so and, therefore, seems to be invalid.
The only case to treat the ambiguities of section 2-702(3) in re-
gard to the lien creditor adopted an approach different from any of the
above. In In re Kravitz,' the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that
40 	 § 2-326, Comment 2.
41 Conceptually, the only way to find that the section 1-201(37) definition applies is
to picture the obligation of the buyer as secured by the seller's right to reclaim.
42 See 	 §§ 9-201, -204.
43 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
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since prior Pennsylvania law gave superior rights to lien creditors
whose claims arose subsequent to the debtor's acquisition of the goods,
the seller's right to reclaim would be defeated by such a creditor. The
court apparently would draw a distinction between prior and subse-
quent creditors and hold the former's interest is cut off by the reclaim-
ing seller whereas the latter's is not cut off. This distinction has been
recognized at common law in a number of jurisdictions on the basis
that the subsequent creditor has relied on the debtor's ownership of
the goods whereas the prior creditor has not." There does not appear,
however, to be any room for such a distinction in section 2-702(3). The
section gives rights to lien creditors but does not distinguish between
prior and subsequent creditors.' It is possible, of course, that the
creditor could show justified reliance sufficient to set up an estoppel
against the seller. In this situation, however, the Code rules could be
supplemented by the common law estoppel principles to give the cred-
itor a remedy.
The better interpretation of the original version of section 2-
702 (3) is that made mandatory by the 1966 version, which provides
that since .Article 2 does not provide for rights of lien creditors, the
reclaiming seller can defeat the interest of a lien creditor. In those
cases where the creditor can show actual reliance he may defeat the
seller's reclamation right if he can establish an estoppel against the
seller under the common law.
Before the 1966 amendment to section 2-702(3), the ambiguities
in the section in regard to lien creditors also raised doubt on the ability
of the reclaiming seller to defeat the claims of the trustee in bankruptcy.
Under Section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee is vested with
all the rights of a lien creditor, whether or not such a creditor could
have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings on the date of
the filing of the bankruptcy proceeding. In Kravitz, the court inter-
44 See Schwartz v. McCloskey, 156 Pa. 258, 27 A. 300 (1893), (the case on which
the court in Kravitz relied); Thompson v. Rose, 16 Conn. 71 (1844) ; Hurd v. Bickford,
85 Me. 217, 27 A. 107 (1892); McAuliffe & Burke Co. v. Gallagher, 258 Mass. 215, 154
N.E. 755 (1927); Buffington v. Gerrish, 15 Mass. 156 (1818) ; Bradley v. Obear, 10 N.H.
447 (1839). The Buffington case was followed without discussion of the prior-subsequent
creditor distinction in Oswego Starch Factory v. Lendrum, 57 Iowa 573, 10 N.W. 900
(1881) ; Sleeper v. Davis, 64 N.H. 59, 6 A. 201 (1886) ; Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570
(N.Y. 1835); Scott v. McGraw, 3 Wash. 675, 29 P. 260 (1892). For a case involving subse-
quent creditors in Which the court said all bona fide purchasers prevail, see Van Duzor v.
Allen, 90 Ill. 499 (1878); but see Schweizer v. Tracy, 76 III. 345 (1875). The Van Duzor
case was distinguished in In re Gold, 210 F. 410 (7th Cir. 1913). Perhaps the only express
holding contra is Field, Morris & Co. v. Stearns, 42 Vt. 106 (1869). It is generally assumed,
however, that the majority view is correct. See Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14
Rutgers L. Rev. 518, 550 (1960); Nordstrom, Restitution on Default and Article Two of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1143, 1159 n.68 (1966).
45 Prior and subsequent creditors have the same rights under sections 2-326 and
9-301. They apparently have the same rights under section 6-104.
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preted section 70c as providing that the trustee in bankruptcy could
defeat the rights of a reclaiming seller, if it were possible that a cred-
itor could defeat those rights." Therefore, the rights of the trustee turn
on the rights of creditors under section 2-702, whatever they may be.
Since the court in Kravitz found that it was possible for a creditor to
defeat the rights of the reclaiming seller, it found that the seller's claim
was invalid against the trustee. Under the 1966 amendment to section
2-702, it is clear that the trustee will not defeat the reclaiming seller
under section 70c.'
The trustee, however, has available another theory of attack under
the Bankruptcy Act. Section 64 of the Act establishes a general order
of priorities for claims against the assets of the bankrupt. State statutes
that attempt to set up a different order of priorities are, of course, pre-
empted by the Federal Act." , Exactly when a state's statute attempts
to set up priorities in bankruptcy, however, is not always easy to deter-
mine. A statute that provides for a lien in favor of a particular type of
creditor, e.g., mechanics, affects the priority of distribution to that
creditor in bankruptcy since a lien creditor takes from the assets be-
fore a general creditor. Since the statute operates whether or not the
debtor is in bankruptcy, however, it is not an attempt to set up an
order of priorities in bankruptcy but, instead, to put this type of creditor
in a preferred position relative to other creditors irrespective of the
financial condition of the debtor." On the other hand, where the state
statute did not denominate the right as a lien," where it did not provide
that the lien was enforceable as against any subsequent lienors, 5 ' where
it provided that the lien arose only upon execution against the property
by another creditor," or where it did not provide that the lien was on
46 The court in Kravitz found that the trustee could prevail regardless of whether
a creditor who could defeat the seller actually existed. The decision of the Supreme Court
in Lewis v. National Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961), may now require a showing that some actual
subsequent creditor existed at the time of bankruptcy. See Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Edwards,
304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Note, 76 Han/. L. Rev. 1296 (1963). Since the Lewis and
Edwards decisions, section 70c has been amended. 80 Stat. 268 (1966). Although the third
sentence of the amended 70c can be read as supporting the view that the presence of an
actual subsequent creditor must be shown, the legislative history does not indicate such
an intent. See S. Rep. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2456.
47 There also is considerable authority indicating that this would be the result even
if the Code had not been amended. See 4A W. Collier, Bankruptcy if 70.41 at 483 n.3,
485 n.7 (14th ed. 1967) ; Anna, 59 A.L.R. 418 (1929).
48 N.W. Day Supply Co. v. Valenti, 343 F.2d 756 (1st Cir. 1965).
49 See 3 W. Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 64.02[21 (14th ed. 1967).
50 In re Crosstown Motors, Inc., 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Strom v. Peikes, 123
F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1941).
.5' N.W. Day Supply Co. v. Valenti, 343 F.2d 756 (1st Cir. 1965) ; In re Ko-Ed
Tavern, Inc., 129 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1942).
52 In re Beardsley, 38 F. Supp. 799 (D. Md. 1941) ; In re Standard Wood Prods.
Co., 38 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Pa. 1941).
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specific property," courts have found that the state has attempted to
create priorities in bankruptcy and, therefore, that the liens are invalid
as against the trustee.
Whether section 2-702, granting the seller the right to reclaim on
the insolvency of the buyer, would be declared as an attempt to create
a priority invalid under the Bankruptcy Act is an open question. In
any event, under the 1966 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, that
question must now be answered by construction of section 67c, 54 since
the priority principle, to the extent it is recognized, is now codified
in that section.'
Section 67c of the Bankruptcy Act now provides:
( 1 ) the following liens shall be invalid against the trustee:
(A) every statutory lien which first becomes effective
upon the insolvency of the debtor, or upon distribution
or liquidation of his property, or upon execution against
his property levied at the instance of one other than the
lienor;
(B) every statutory lien which is not perfected or en-
forceable at the date of bankruptcy against one acquiring
the rights of a bona fide purchaser from the debtor on
that date, whether or not such purchaser exists: Provided,
That where a statutory lien is not invalid at the date of
bankruptcy against the trustee under subdivision (c) of
section 110 of this title and is required by applicable lien
law to be perfected in order to be valid against a subse-
quent bona fide purchaser, such a lien may nevertheless
be valid under this subdivision if perfected within the
time permitted by and in accordance with the require-
ments of such law... . 56
Section 1(29a) 57
 defines "statutory lien" as "a lien arising solely
by force of statute upon specified circumstances or conditions, but
shall not include any lien provided by or dependent upon an agreement
to give security, whether or not such lien is also provided by or is also
dependent upon statute and whether or not the agreement or lien is
made fully effective by statute." It is clear that if the seller's right to
reclaim is a statutory lien, it is invalid as against the trustee under
67c(1) (B) since it is not enforceable against one acquiring the rights
53 Strom v. Peikes, 123 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1941). Cf. Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749
(9th Cir. 1966).
54 11 U.S.C. § 107c (Supp. II 1966), amending 11 U.S.C. § 107c (1964).
55 See S. Rep. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. Niws
2456, 2457.
56 11
	 § 107(c) (Supp. II 1966).
57 11 U.S.C. § 1(29a) (Supp. II 1966).
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of a bona fide purchaser from the debtor on the date of bankruptcy.
Thus, the central question is whether the reclamation right is a sta-
tutory lien within the definition in section 1(29a). There are two possi-
ble answers that will result in upholding section 2-702 against the
trustee: (1) the right to reclaim is not a lien; (2) the right to reclaim
is not "statutory" since it does not arise "solely by force of statute."
There should be no doubt that the seller's right to reclaim is a
lien, at least up to the point that he asserts his right and regains tech-
nical title. It is a claim on specified property arising out of an under-
lying debt.' Prior cases invalidating state statutory rights because
they were not called "liens" were justifiable only as attempts to distin-
guish between valid state liens and invalid, state-created priorities where
Congress had failed to provide definitions of these terms. Now that
Congress has specifically defined statutory lien and indicated when it
should be treated as a priority, the state denomination of the right
should not be important. Further, it would be consonant with the pur-
pose of the Bankruptcy Act to hold that the seller has a lien even after
he regains title since he does not have possession. In that case, however,
since a good faith purchaser cannot defeat the seller's interest after he
regains title, the seller's right is enforceable against the trustee. Since
the reclamation right is a lien, the validity of that lien against the
trustee must turn on whether it is "statutory," that is, whether it
arises solely by force of statute.
Although the term "statutory lien" never had a specific statutory
definition, it has always been a part of the bankruptcy law. For the
most part, however, the cases that turn on a determination of whether
a particular right is a statutory lien are of little help in assessing sec-
tion 2-702. Courts have found that consensual liens are not statutory
liens.'" On the other hand, they have found tax liens and mechanic's
liens to be statutory, since they clearly arise solely by force of statute.'"
Between these two extremes, however, the law is somewhat unclear. For
example, a vendor's lien has been found to be statutory even though
it is, at least in part, consensual."'
58 See In re New Haven Clock & Watch Co., 253 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958) ; Lockhart
v. Garden City Rank & Trust Co., 116 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1940) ; United States v. First
Nat'l Bank, 240 F. Supp. 347 (ND. Tex. 1965); In re Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F.
Supp. 739 (D.N.J. 1955). But see White v. Karl Kiefer Mach. Co., 127 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.
1942).
59 Cases cited note 57 supra.
60 See In re Rhine, 213 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963) (mechanics' lien). Section 67b
provides that tax liens are statutory liens. 11 U.S.C. § 107(6) (Supp. II 1966).
61 See Commercial Credit Co. v. Davidson, 112 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1940). See also In
re Standard Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 174 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1949) (Sheriff's lien for fees
from an execution) ; Halpert v. Industrial Comm'r, 147 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1945) (lien for
a workmen's compensation award); Lyford v. New York, 140 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1944)
(lien for the cost of eliminating a grade crossing); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Sun
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The seller's right to reclaim is clearly neither a vendor's lien nor a
consensual lien. It has one important attribute, however, that would
seem to take it out of the class in which vendor's liens, tax liens, etc.
are placed. Tax liens or even vendor's liens have no common law ante-
cedents. In contrast, the rights of the defrauded seller to rescind and to
reclaim have been recognized in the absence of statute. Although section
2-702 may in effect modify the common law definition of fraud by allow-
ing the seller to reclaim within 10 days even though there is not actual
misrepresentation of solvency, it is clear that basically the reclamation
right is derived from the common law.€ 2 Since the reclamation right is
derived from the common law, it would not appear to arise "solely by
force of statute."
Although the above conclusion has the support of logic, there is
some pre-amendment case law which casts doubts on its validity.
Banker's liens and repairman's liens have been held to be statutory
liens even though they have common law antecedents 63 The courts in
these cases, however, did not appear to recognize that common law
antecedents existed or that their existence would be relevant.
A more difficult case to reconcile is Elliott v. Bumb, 64 where the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a floating lien on the assets
of a debtor was in "conflict with the federal bankruptcy scheme" even
though it was allowed by state law.° In Elliott, a credit agency was
appointed as the agent of a retail market to sell checks and money
orders that the market issued. The agency sold about $3,000 of these
checks and money orders but placed only part of the proceeds in a
separate bank account for its principal. The remainder was commingled
with the agency's other assets. Subsequently, an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy was brought against the agent, and it was adjudged a bank-
rupt. Under the common law of California, where the transaction took
place, the money in the separate bank account was held in trust for the
principal. The trust would not cover the rest of the proceeds unless the
market could trace them in the hands of the agent. This rule was
changed by a California statute which imposed a trust on all the money
collected by the agent whether or not it could be traced.
The court found that the market could take the $2,000 in the bank
account as beneficiary of a valid common law trust but that, since the
market would take the commingled proceeds only as a creditor under
Lumber Co., 126 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1942) (laborer's lien on all of the employer's
assets).
62 See 3 S. Williston, Sales § 632 (rev. ed. 1948).
63 Gordon v. Sullivan, 188 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; Goggin v. Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 183 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1950).
64 356 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1966).
65 Id. at 755. But cf. In re Treister & Son, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 144 (S.D. N.Y. 1956) ; In
re Heintzelman Const. Co., 34 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. N.Y. 1940).
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the common law, it could not -take these proceeds as beneficiary under
the California statute." In reaching this conclusion, it found that the
California statute attempted to set up a priority where none existed
in the Bankruptcy Act and, therefore, that it was invalid in bankruptcy.
The similarity between the California statute in Elliott and section
2-702 is clear. As noted above, the common law allowed a seller to re-
scind a sale induced by a fraudulent misrepresentation of solvency by
the buyer. Once the seller elected to rescind, the buyer would hold the
property as a constructive trustee for the benefit of the seller, 67 just as
the agent held the funds in the bank account for his principal. Section
2-702, like the California statute, is an attempt to increase the situations
where a constructive trust will result.
It is here, however, that the similarity ends. In its statute, Califor-
nia has modified common law trust principles. The drafters of the Code,
on the other hand, have modified the definition of fraud. Thus, where
the California statute does not affect the right of the principal, but
merely solidifies his remedy, the Code attempts to reinforce a common
law right. This right-remedy distinction should dictate that section
2-702 should not be invalidated under Elliott. Statutory attempts to put
creditors in a better position to enforce common law rights are clearly
priorities since they increase the creditor's chance of enforcement when
other creditors are involved. On the other hand, a statute that expands
the scope of common law principles such as fraud affects the rights
between the creditor and the debtor, and is not an attempt to set up a
priority even though the remedy that is traditionally given with that
right will put the creditor in a better position in relation to other
creditors.
There may be a point, however, where even a statute that extends
an existing right would be considered a state-created priority under
Elliott. Thus, if California had defined the agent's retention of pro-
ceeds to be fraudulent as to the principal, it is doubtful that the court
would let such action stand. Section 2-702 may transcend this boundary,
since it allows the seller to reclaim even if he knew of the insolvency of
the buyer when he shipped the goods." It is almost inconceivable, how-
ever, that such a situation would ever arise.
The exact effect of the 1966 Bankruptcy Act amendments on these
66 State law trusts are enforced in bankruptcy unless they depart from the general
norm of trust law so much that they create, in effect, a state insolvency rule. In re Tate-
Jones & Co., 85 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Pa. 1949). See Comment, The No Property Rule in
Federal Tax Lien Litigation, 24 Md. L. Rev. 310 (1964).
67 Bogert § 471 at 6 (2d ed. 1960).
08 See, Kennedy, supra note 44, at 552, 555; Note, Bankruptcy and Article Two of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 598, 611-12 (1966). A conclusive pre-
sumption of reliance on the debtor's insolvency might be applied here to circumvent
situations such as these. Cf. Glenn § 343, at 597-98.
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earlier statutory lien cases is unclear. In any event, the definition of
statutory lien contained in section 1(29a) should not be applied any
more strictly than the definition that can be extracted from the pre-
amendment cases. As long as the courts recognize that the seller's right
to reclaim does not arise solely by force of statute, the trustee should
not be able to defeat the right in bankruptcy."
One additional point must be mentioned. The effect of finding that
section 2-702 does not create a statutory lien would be a re-examination
and a reversal of cases that held that bankers' liens and garagemen's
liens were statutory liens. Even though these liens would not be invalid
under Section 67c of the Bankruptcy Act," this holding has important
ramifications. Section 67 gives statutory liens immunity from a chal-
lenge under section 60, 71 which invalidates preferences. A preference
is defined as any transfer of a debtor's property to a creditor on account
of an antecedent debt, made while the debtor is insolvent within four
months of bankruptcy if the effect of the transfer is to enable the
creditor to obtain a greater share of his debt than some other creditor.
The right to reclaim can never be a preference since the seller's right
accrues the minute the debt is created, and, thus, there is not an ante-
cedent debt situation." A banker, on the other hand, may take a lien
to secure an antecedent debt." Similarly, a garageman may lose his lien
by relinquishing possession of a vehicle and then regain his lien by
regaining possession.' If either of these situations occur within four
months of bankruptcy the lien may be invalidated under section 60.
Although this result would be a major change in the law, it is a
change that is consistent with the policy of section 67. The immunity
from section 60 is necessary to validate tax liens and mechanic's liens
which are inchoate when they arise. Otherwise, these liens could never
be valid if the debtor should go bankrupt within four months from the
time that the value is given and the liens are created. The banker or the
garageman, on the other hand, can avoid having the liens arise because
69 There are also policy factors that may weigh in favor of the seller's right to
reclaim. The section does not apply to a class of persons generally, that is, all sellers.
Section 67b of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1964), treats statutory liens of
classes of persons. It is possible that this limited treatment of statutory liens may also be
applied in interpreting sections 1(29a), 11 U.S.C. § 1(29a) (Supp. II 1967), and 67c, 11
U.S.C. § 107(b) (1964).
Also, the seller's reclamation right applies only to the property transferred, whereas
only floating liens, for the most past, have been invalidated. See H.R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess., 1952 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1960, 1973.
7 0 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1964).
71 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
7 2 Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Or. 1928) ; Kennedy, supra note
44, at 554-56; Note, supra note 68, at 612.
73 See Goggin v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 183 F.2d 322 (9th Cir.
1950).
74 See Gordon v. Sullivan, 188 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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of an antecedent debt and should respond to a claim that he has re-
ceived a voidable preference if he does not so avoid the liens.
III. RIGHTS OF A BUYER NOT HAVING POSSESSION
Under the Code, the buyer who does not have possession has
available three possible theories under which he can establish a right
to possession. Section 2-716(1) provides that the buyer may obtain
specific performance of the contract and, thus, obtain the goods "where
the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances?"75 Under section
2-716(3), the buyer may replevy the goods if they are identified to the
contract and if the buyer cannot obtain substitute goods by reasonable
efforts. Finally, under section 2-502, a buyer who has paid part or all of
the purchase price to a seller who becomes insolvent within ten days
after the first payment of the price can recover goods identified to the
contract.
This section of the article will analyze the right of the buyer to
obtain possession as against his seller and third party claimants: the
buyer in the ordinary course of business, a good faith purchaser other
than a buyer in the ordinary course, a lien creditor and the trustee in
bankruptcy. The rights of the buyer against the seller will be analyzed
under each of the theories presented above. The rights of the buyer
against third party claimants will not be analyzed in terms of the
theory on which the buyer is basing his claim for the goods. Generally,
the rights against third parties are the same regardless of which theory
is used. The right to specific performance, however, is not available
against subsequent purchasers since the purchaser is not a party to the
contract. Therefore, the discussion of subsequent purchasers is not
relevant when the buyer is attempting to obtain the goods through spe-
cific performance.
A. Rights Against the Seller
The right to specific performance contained in section 2-716(1)
was recognized at common law" and under the Uniform Sales Act.77
The section was not intended to change the law to a significant degree
or to inhibit its growth. It was intended, however, to foster a liberal
attitude in the courts as to when specific performance shall be given.78
The section 2-716(3) right to replevin overlaps the right to spe-
cific performance to a great extent. Section 2-716(3) requires that
substitute goods cannot be obtained. This lack of substitute goods
75 This subsection may also give the buyer the right to possession of goods in
transit.
78 See SA A. Corbin, Contracts § 1146 (1964).
77 U.S.A. § 68.
78 U.C.C. 2-716, Comment 1.
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would also seem to make the goods "unique" so that specific perfor-
mance would be available. Replevin is available, however, only when
the goods have been identified to the contract, whereas specific per-
formance is available even if there is no identification.
The section 2-502 right to recover the goods is available to the
buyer only if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt
of the first installment of the price. The section does not appear to
apply to transactions in which the buyer makes an initial payment of
all or part of the price after the seller becomes insolvent." This read-
ing may impose a hardship on the buyer, however. The Code contains
three alternative definitions of insolvency in section 1-201(23) : ceasing
to pay debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business, in-
ability to pay debts as they become due, or excess of debts over avail-
able assets." It is unlikely that the buyer will know if the seller is
insolvent under either of the last two definitions since the buyer has no
way of valuing the seller's assets or liabilities. The buyer may, however,
be able to determine whether the seller has ceased to pay his debts
although even this determination may be difficult to make. If all three
of the definitions apply to section 2-502, the buyer who pays part or
all of the price after determining that the seller has not ceased to pay
his debts may not be able to recover the goods because the seller's debts
exceeded his assets at the time of payment. Yet this buyer has clearly
been defrauded to the same extent as a buyer who pays the price before
the seller is insolvent.
This inequitable situation can be remedied by interpretation of
section 2-502 as encompassing only one of the three definitions of in-
solvency in section 2-201(23). That is, the definitions that involve in-
ability to pay debts should be found to be inappropriate to section
2-502 since the buyer has no practical way of determining if the seller
is unable to pay all of his debts.
With some slight straining of language it might be possible to give
the buyer more protection. The burden of checking on whether the seller
has ceased to pay his debts is probably too great for the buyer to bear.
Therefore, if the phrase "becomes insolvent within ten days after
receipt of the first installment" were interpreted to mean "becomes in-
solvent at any time prior to ten days after payment," the buyer would
be relieved of the burden of showing that the seller had not ceased to
pay his debts when payment was made. In addition to relieving the
buyer of a difficult burden, this interpretation would also put his rights
on an equal footing with the rights of the seller where the buyer is
79 See Nordstrom, supra note 44, at 1178; Peters, Remedies for Breach of Con-
tracts Relating to the Sale of Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap
for Article Two, 73 Yale L.J. 199, 235 (1963) ; Note, supra note 68, at 601.
90 The third definition of insolvency is that of the Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), 11
U.S.C. § 1(19) (1964).
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insolvent. If the buyer is insolvent when the goods are delivered, the
seller may reclaim under section 2-702 even if the buyer made no repre-
sentation of solvency. There is no reason why this type of implied
fraud rule should not be applied where the seller is insolvent.
B. Rights Against a Buyer in the Ordinary Course
Under section 2-403(2), any entrusting of possession of goods to
a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him the power to
transfer all rights in those goods to a buyer in the ordinary course of
business.' Entrusting in this context includes any acquiescence in pos-
session.' Since a buyer in the ordinary course of business must, by
definition, take goods from a dealer of goods of that kind and since a
buyer who is attempting to recover possession under sections 2-716 or
2-502 will always have acquiesced to possession in his seller, a third
party buyer in the ordinary course will always cut off the rights of a
prior buyer attempting to obtain possession of the goods.
Although it is clear that a buyer will lose to a subsequent buyer in
the ordinary course of business, it is not clear when a subsequent buyer
fits within the definition of buyer in the ordinary course of business
contained in section 1-201(9):
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in
good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in
violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third
party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in
the business of selling goods of that kind but does not include
a pawnbroker ....
Section 25 of the Uniform Sales Act is similar to section 2-403 (2).
Section 25, however, required that the subsequent buyer obtain posses-
sion and pay value before he could defeat the interest of the original
buyer.83 Under the Code, it is clear that the subsequent buyer does not
have to give value immediately to be a buyer in the ordinary course of
business." It is not clear, however, whether the subsequent buyer must
obtain possession." In fact, there is no statement in the Code that a
buyer in the ordinary course of business must obtain title.
81 See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) for the definition of buyer in ordinary course of business.
82 U.C.C. § 2-403(3).
83 See, e.g., Coburn v. Drown, 114 Vt. 158, 40 A.2d 528 (1945).
81 This was also true under the Sales Act. See Hewgley v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 39 Tenn. App. 553, 286 S.W.2d 355 (1955). If the second buyer has not paid for
the goods, the first buyer may still have some remedy. He can sue the seller and establish
a trust interest in the unpaid purchase price. If the seller has received the price and has
commingled it with his other monetary assets, the buyer can no longer do this. See
Bogert § 476.
85 , See generally 1 New York Law Revision Commission Report, Study of the Uni-
form Commercial Code 232, 457 (1955).
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Analysis of this ambiguity in the Code must begin with the defini-
tion of buyer in the ordinary course of business in section 1-201(9).
Such a buyer is there defined in terms of a person who "buys in the
ordinary course." Buying is then partially defined:
"Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property or
on secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods
or documents of title under a pre-existing contract for sale ....
The use of the words "receiving goods" indicates that taking possession
is a requisite to buying.
Defining buying in terms of possession, however, creates some diffi-
culty in this context. The definition of buying in the ordinary course
of business includes a requirement that there be a sale. Although sale
is not defined in Article I, it is defined in section 2-106(1):
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires .. .
"[c] ontract for sale" includes both a present sale of goods and
a contract to sell goods at a future time. A "sale" consists in
the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price
(Section 2-401). A "present sale" means a sale which is accom-
plished by the making of the contract.
From this definition two conclusions can be drawn: (1) a sale is
more than simply a contract for sale; (2) a passage of title is a neces-
sary element of a sale. Since passage of title does not depend on pas-
sage of possession," it may also be inferred that passage of possession
is not a prerequisite to the existence of a sale. If a sale can be completed
without the passage of possession, it would be ironic to find that one
cannot buy without receiving possession.
There are two possible solutions to this apparent conflict. The
Article 2 definition of sale may not be applicable in Article 1. 87 As a
result, a sale for purposes of Article 1 may require passage of posses-
sion even though a sale under Article 2 does not." A better alternative
comes from an examination of the definition of buying. Section 1-201(9)
states that " 'buying' . includes receiving goods ... under a pre-exist-
ing contract for sale. (Emphasis added.)" Since receiving goods under a
pre-existing contract for sale is only an example of buying, the possi-
bility that one can buy without taking possession is not excluded.
Neither of these alternatives is particularly convincing, and, for
88 See U.C.C. 2-401(2).
87 See section 2-106(1), which begins "In this Article...."
88 This, of course, may require some mental gymnastics when the definition of
buyer in the ordinary course is used in section 2-403(2). If the definition of sale in Article
2 does not apply to Article 1, what happens to a term that is defined in Article 1 in terms
of "sale" when it is applied in Article 2?
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this reason, it is doubtful that analysis of the buyer in the ordinary
course requirements should be attempted from the definitions of "buy-
ing" and "sale." It is more fruitful to look to the context within which
the term buyer in the ordinary course is used and especially at the
apparent purpose of the provisions. Subsection (2) of section 2-403
which provides for the rights of the buyer in the ordinary course of
business talks of entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant. Sub-
section (1) of section 2-403, on the other hand, refers to title, voidable
title and good faith purchasers." Purchaser as defined in the Code in-
cludes anyone taking by sale and, therefore, anyone taking title." It
appears that subsection (1) and subsection (2) are meant to be dis-
tinguished. That is, where subsection ( 1) is concerned with title, sub-
section (2) is concerned with possession. In this context, therefore, the
intent of the drafters would appear to be that a buyer is not a buyer
in the ordinary course until he obtains possession."
C. Rights of the Buyer Against Other Good Faith Purchasers
The relative rights of a buyer and a subsequent good faith pur-
chaser other than a buyer in the ordinary course are difficult to dis-
cover. When the Uniform Sales Act was in force there were three
possible theories under which the subsequent good faith purchaser
could defeat the interest of the original buyer in the goods. Section 25
provided that the subsequent purchaser would defeat the rights of the
original seller if the purchaser could show that he obtained possession
and paid the purchase price in good faith. Under section 23, the sub-
sequent purchaser may prevail if title is in the original buyer and the
original buyer is, by his conduct, estopped from denying the seller's
authority to sell." The third theory was based on fraudulent retention
of .possession by the seller. Under the common law of some states,
retention of possession by the seller was presumed to be fraudulent."
29 Subsection (1) is concerned with the power of a purchaser to transfer title to
goods when he has received only voidable title.
9° See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(32), -201(33).
01 This interpretation is supported by the wording of prior versions of the Code. In
the 1950 draft of the Code, buyer in ordinary course of business was defined in section
2-403(4) as "a person to whom goods are shipped pursuant to a pre-existing contract or
one to whom they are delivered on credit. . . ." Since the buyer in the ordinary course
had to take delivery, he had to obtain possession. This interpretation is also consistent
with the analogous situation of a secured party attempting to enforce against a buyer of
the collateral. In that case the buyer will defeat an unperfected security interest but only
if the buyer obtains possession. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c). Although the necessity of posses-
sion seems clear, one case may suggest that only tide is important. Cf. Main Inv. Co. v.
Gisolfi, 203 Pa. Super. 244, 199 A.2d 535 (1964).
92 The buyer must give the seller some indicia of ownership. Possession in the seller
is not sufficient to set up an estoppel. See Avis Rent-A-Car Sys. v. Woelfel, 155 Colo.
207, 393 P.2d 551 (1964).
93 See Glenn at § 354. But cf. Coburn v. Downs, 114 Vt. 158,40 A.2d 528 (1945).
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This principle remained in most states even though the Uniform Sales
Act was in effect."
The Code continues the estoppel theory in section 2-403(2), but
only when the buyer is a buyer in ordinary course. Otherwise, the
fraudulent retention theory and the provisions of sections 23 and 25 of
the Uniform Sales Act as they are relevant here are not expressly car-
ried into the Code. Because of this ambiguity, a number of arguments
can be made respecting the rights of the buyer against a subsequent
good faith purchaser."
One possible method of attacking the problem is to look to sec-
tions 2-716 and 2-502, which define the rights of the buyer as against
his seller. It can be argued that in the absence of provisions to the con-
trary, the rights of the buyer are contained solely in these sections. If
this argument is accepted a number of conclusions can be drawn.
Section 2-502 provides that the buyer can recover the goods "from
the seller" if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt
of the first installment of the price. Since recovery only against the
seller is mentioned, the buyer must have no rights against a subsequent
buyer.
Section 2-716(3) provides for replevin, but it does not state who is
subject to this right of replevin. Therefore, it would seem that the
buyer could replevy the goods from any person who has possession of
them.
Although these conclusions may have some merit, the chance of
their acceptance is small in view of the weakness of the assumption be-
hind them. There is no indication either in the sections or in the com-
ments to the sections that they were intended to provide for the buyer's
rights against anyone other than the seller. As a result, conclusions
drawn on the presence of the words "from the seller" or the absence of
mention of any person against whom the buyer can enforce seem to be
invalid. Another possible approach is to form a rule depending solely
on title in the buyer. Section 2-403(1) provides that a "person with
voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith pur-
chaser for value." Since a person with voidable title can transfer good
title, it would seem that a person with complete title can also do so.
Thus it can be argued that as long as the seller has title he has the power
to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value and defeat the
interest of the buyer. When title is shifted to the buyer, however, the
94 See Glenn at § 354.
9 5
 The problems associated with the estoppel and fraudulent retention of possession
theories will not be discussed in the following analyis. It is assumed that if the second
buyer can show that the original buyer is estopped, or that the retention of possession by
the seller is fraudulent under the common law, the second buyer will win.
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seller can no longer transfer title unless his retention of possession is
fraudulent."
The effect of such a rule would be to afford negligible protection
to the buyer since only in rare instances would the seller still have
possession after title had'shif ted to the buyer. Thus for this reason, it is
somewhat doubtful that section 2 -403(1) was intended to cover this
situation. For this reason, the leap from the "voidable title" language
of the section to the perfect title of the seller, subject to his contractual
obligations, should not be taken in spite of the logical simplicity of
such a step.
An entirely different approach to the problem of the subsequent
good faith purchaser is suggested by section 2 -403(4): "The rights of
other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed by the
Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9). . . ." If this reference is
applicable to the rights of subsequent purchasers against the original
buyer, the original buyer must have a security interest in the goods.
It is somewhat difficult to say that the buyer's contract rights are,
in actuality, a security interest. Where the goods are identified to the
contract and the buyer has received a special property interest, how-
ever, the theory stands on firmer ground. It is possible to conceptualize
this special property interest as an interest securing the seller's per-
formance of his obligation. The property interest gives the buyer
greater rights since he can obtain replevin under section 2-716, or
recovery where the seller is insolvent under section 2-502 once the goods
are identified to the contract. This is not to say that in all instances
when the buyer obtains a special property interest he is a secured
party. The rule could be limited to those instances where the special
property interest is intended as security because the buyer has paid
part or all of the price and the seller still has possession of the goods.
If the security interest approach were accepted," the original
buyer would lose his claim to the goods to a purchaser who gave value
and obtained possession without knowledge of the original buyer's in-
terest, unless he perfected his security interest's Once the original
buyer perfected, he would defeat the interest of the subsequent good
faith purchaser."
Although the security interest approach is a logical solution to the
problem of the subsequent good faith purchaser, it is of little more than
historical significance. Section 9-204(6) originally provided that a
96 Even if it is not fraudulent, a second buyer in ordinary course may win under
§ 2-403(2).
97 The conceptual and practical problems associated with this interpretation are
well set out in 1 New York Law Revision Commission Reports, Study of the Uniform
Commercial Code 453-54 (1955),
98 See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c).
99 There is an exception to this rule for consumer goods and farm equipment. See
U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
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buyer who advanced money for the acquisition or production of goods
obtained a security interest in the goods.'"° In 1958, this provision was
dropped from the Code and the following language was added to the
definition of security interest contained in section 1-201(37) :
The special property interest of a buyer of goods on identifica-
tion of such goods to a contract for sale under Section 2-401
is not a "security interest," but a buyer may also acquire a
"security interest" by complying with Article 9.
In view of this language, it can no longer be argued that the buyer ob-
tains a security interest when the goods become identified to the con-
tract. It might be possible to argue that when the buyer obtains full
title while the seller still has possession, the buyer obtains a security
interest. This argument is of doubtful validity, however, since title
gives the buyer no more rights against the seller than he has when he
obtains only a special property interest.
There are no other sections of the Code that can be interpreted
to apply to the problem of determining the buyer's rights against a
subsequent good faith purchaser. There is, however, an analogous situ-
ation which the Code provides for that can be used in reaching a
realistic solution. As noted above, under section 9-301(1) (c) an un-
perfected secured interest will be defeated by a buyer who gives value
and takes possession without knowledge of the security interest. If the
security interest is perfected, however, it will defeat the interest of such
a buyer.
A situation similar to that provided for in section 9-301 is present
here where the subsequent purchaser is not a secured party but a buyer.
If the subsequent buyer does not have possession, he is like the holder
of an unperfected security interest since third parties have no notice of
his interest. If he obtains possession the result is the same as perfecting
a security interest—he gives notice of his claim to third parties.
If the analogy were strictly followed, the original buyer would
defeat the interest of subsequent good faith purchasers only if those
purchasers had not obtained possession. Although this priority seems
like the best solution to the problem of the subsequent good faith pur-
chaserm it does have deficiencies. It does not come from the express
language of the Code, but, instead, must be built up by analogy. Also,
the result is to provide the same rights to a good faith purchaser as to
Ion U.C.C. § 9-204(6) (1952 version).
101 There are other possible solutions that are not covered in the text because the
probability of their acceptance is minimal. For example, section 2-722 gives the buyer a
right of action against a third party who deals with the goods as to cause actionable
injury to the buyer. Although the section on its face appears to open up possibilities, it
has never been interpreted as giving substantive rights.
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a buyer in the ordinary course even though the buyer in the ordinary
course is singled out for protection in section 2-403(2).
D. Rights of the Buyer Against Subsequent Lien Creditors
The buyer's rights against the subsequent lien creditor are, for the
most part, governed by section 2-402. Under subsection (2) of section
2-402, the buyer will defeat the interest of a subsequent creditor if four
requirements are met: (1) there has been a sale or identification of the
goods to the contract; (2) the seller is a merchant; (3) the retention of
possession by the seller is in good faith and in the current course of
trade; and (4) the retention is for a commercially reasonable time. If,
however, the retention is fraudulent under state law and the buyer can-
not meet the four requirements set out above the creditor will defeat
the rights of the buyer. Also, under subsection (3), if the identification
or delivery to the buyer is not made in the current course of trade but,
instead, in satisfaction of or as security for a pre-existing claim, the
creditor will defeat the buyer if the circumstances are such that the
transaction would be fraudulent under state law.
Subsections (2) and (3) of section 2-402 refer to the rights of
"creditors," but they do not state what kind of creditors fall within the
subsections. At common law, a seller's creditor can prevail under a
fraudulent retention of possession theory only if he attaches or levies
before the buyer obtains possession.'" In absence of statements to the
contrary in subsections (2) and (3), it is safe to assume that the com-
mon law requirement that the creditor levy or attach is carried on.
Subsection (1) of section 2-402 also deals with the rights of the
buyer against subsequent creditors. It provides that, except as provided
in subsections (2) and (3), rights of "unsecured creditors" are subject
to buyer's rights under sections 2-502 and 2-716. It is unclear what
is meant by the term "unsecured creditors" in this subsection. Since the
term "creditor" is used in subsections (2) and (3), it is possible that a
different type of creditor comes under subsection (1). If subsections (2)
and (3) deal with the lien creditor, it can be argued that the "unsecured
creditor" provided for in subsection (1) is not a lien creditor but only
a general creditor."'
It is doubtful, however, that such weight should be given to the
word "unsecured." It is more likely that an "unsecured creditor" is
simply a creditor who is not secured. Thus, under subsection (1) both
the general and the lien creditor cannot defeat the section 2-502 and
section 2-716 rights of the buyer.
102 Glenn at § 349.
103 See Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Section 2-702(3):
Another View of Lien Creditor's Rights vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 W. Res.
L. Rev. 93, 109 (1962).
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There is one more section that may be relevant to the buyer's
rights against lien creditors. Section 2 -403(4) provides that the "rights
of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed by
(Article 9). .. ." In view of the ambiguities in section 2-402, this sec-
tion could be interpreted as providing the sole source of the rights of
lien creditors. Section 2-402 would then be interpreted as dealing only
with the rights of buyers against general creditors. It is doubtful, how-
ever, that this is a proper interpretation of section 2-403(4). Article 9
has no section that provides for the rights of lien creditors against
buyers. The effect, then, would be to give lien creditors no rights against
the buyer even though under section 2-402 general creditors would
have rights if the retention of possession by the seller were fraudulent.
It is more likely that section 2 -403 (4) is referring to the rights of "other
purchasers," specifically secured parties, as against lien creditors.
If the foregoing analysis is accepted, then the rights of the seller
can be capsulized simply. If the buyer can show that the four require-
ments of subsection (2) of section 2-402 are met, the buyer's claim to
the goods is superior to that of lien creditors. If the requirements of
subsection (2) are not met, but the retention of possession by the seller is
not fraudulent under state common law, the buyer still has a superior
claim to the goods if they are identified to the contract. If the sub-
section (2) requirements are not met and the retention of possession is
fraudulent under state common law, however, the lien creditor will
defeat the rights of the buyer.
E. Rights of the Buyer Against the Trustee in Bankruptcy
The trustee in bankruptcy has available four possible theories to
defeat the rights of the buyer under sections 2-716 and 2 - 502: (1) the
buyer's rights are subject to those of a lien creditor and, therefore, are
subject to the claim of the trustee under the Bankruptcy Act, Sections
67d , tot 700" and 70e; 108 (2) the contract between the seller and the
buyer is executory and, therefore, the trustee can reject it under Section
70b of the Bankruptcy Act; 107 (3) sections 2-502 and 2-716 are statu-
tory liens invalid against the trustee under Section 67c of the Bank-
ruptcy Act; 1°8 (4) the buyer's "special property interest" is a voidable
preference under Bankruptcy Act Section 60.' 09 This section will con-
sider the applicability and strength of each of these theories.
Sections 67d"° and 70c" 1 of the Bankruptcy Act deal with trans-
104 11 	 § 107(d) (1964) .
105 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964), as amended, (Supp. 'II 1966).
1°6 § 110(e) (1964).
107 11 U.S.C. 110(6) (1964).
toe 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II 1966).
1°9 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
110 Section 67d(2) (d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2) (d) (1964), allows the trustee to set
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fers that are fraudulent as to creditors. Section 70c gives the trustee the
rights of a lien creditor at the time of bankruptcy.' In those instances
where the buyer will defeat the rights of a lien creditor, it is clear that
he will also defeat the claims of the trustee under sections 67d, 70c or
70e, since these sections give the trustee no greater rights than a
lien creditor. 113 Where the retention of possession by the seller is
deemed fraudulent as to creditors, the trustee will defeat the interest of
the buyer under these three sections.
The trustee's power to set aside executory contracts will be a sub-
stantial weapon against the buyer. Where the goods have not been
identified to the contract there is no doubt that the contract is execu-
tory. Existing decisions appear to go even further. If the goods have
been identified to the contract or if the buyer has paid all of the price,
the trustee will probably be able to set aside the contract. In these situ-
ations the contract is still executory from the side of the seller and this
is crucial!"
In situations where part of the price has been paid the result upon
the buyer may be inequitable. Although it has been suggested that the
trustee would have to return the buyer's down payment,' the few
decisions on point show that the buyer is treated as a general creditor
regardless of whether he has advanced part of the price."' In addition,
the trustee will almost always want to set aside the contract where the
buyer has paid part of the price. The trustee's role is to make as large a
pool as possible for the general creditors. As a result, he will set aside
executory contracts where the value which the bankrupt is obligated to
give is worth more than the value the bankrupt will receive.'" Where
the buyer advances the price, the value of the goods will almost always
exceed the part of the price still due. Therefore, it is to the trustee's
advantage to set aside the contract and retain the goods.
The trustee's argument that the buyer's rights are statutory liens
aside transfers made within one year of bankruptcy if these transfers were made with the
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud existing creditors.
111 Section 70e, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1964), voids transfers that are fraudulent as
against creditors.
• 112 Under section 70c, 11 U.S.C: § 110(c) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II 1966), the
trustee has the rights and powers of (1) a creditor who obtained a judgment on the
date of bankruptcy, (2) a creditor who executed on the day of bankruptcy and (3) a
creditor who obtained a lien on the date of bankruptcy.
113 Cf. Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
111 Compare Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and Re-
organization, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 467, 474-83 (1964) with Note, supra note 68, at 604.
115 Silverstein, supra note 114, at 475. Whether the trustee's rejection is viewed as a
rescission or a rejection of burdensome property, it would seem equitable to require him
to return the down payment.
116 See Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1963). Cf. Matter of
New York Inv. Mut. Group, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
117 See Note, supra note 68, at 604.
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invalid in bankruptcy raises problems similar to those raised in rela-
tion to the seller's right to reclaim."' Analysis of this argument must
be directed at answering four questions: (1) Are the buyer's rights
liens? (2) Are they statutory liens within the definition contained in
Section 1(29a) of the Bankruptcy Act? (3) Do the buyer's rights first
arise on the insolvency of the seller? (4) Can a bona fide purchaser
defeat the buyer's rights on the day of bankruptcy? As discussed earlier,
in order to prevail, the trustee must show that the first two questions
can be answered in the affirmative and that one of the last two can also
be answered in the affirmative.
There is no doubt that the first requirement is met; sections 2-716
and 2-502 give the buyer a lien.' The fourth requirement creates more
difficulty. As discussed above, it is not clear whether a subsequent bona
fide purchaser can defeat the rights of the buyer under sections 2-716
and 2-502. A subsequent buyer in the ordinary course will defeat the
rights of the buyer. Although the buyer in the ordinary course may be
viewed as a type of bona fide purchaser, this fact should not be deter-
minative. Section 67c refers only to a bona fide purchaser In compari-
son, other sections of the Bankruptcy Act use the term buyer in the
ordinary course when rights against such a buyer are important. 12° As
a result, the absence of specific mention of the buyer in the ordinary
course in section 67c should be interpreted to mean that a bona fide
purchaser other than a buyer in the ordinary course must be able to
defeat the buyer.
Whether the third requirement is met depends upon which theory
the buyer is proceeding. Clearly neither the section 2-716(1) right to
specific performance nor the section 2-716(3) right to reclaim first
arise on the insolvency of the seller. On the other hand the buyer's right
to recover under section 2-502 does arise when the seller becomes in-
solvent. Again, however, the fact that the Code contains three defini-
tions of insolvency and the Bankruptcy Act contains only one becomes
important. It is possible that the buyer's rights under section 2-502
may arise on the insolvency of the seller, but not in the bankruptcy
sense. For example, the buyer's right may arise when the seller ceases
to pay his debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business
even though the seller's financial condition is not such that it meets the
Bankruptcy Act test of debts exceeding assets. In such a case, the
buyer's right to recover does not arise on the insolvency of the debtor
as required by section 67c.' 21 It was suggested above that the test of
118 see p. 52 supra, where Sections 67c and 1(29a) of the Bankruptcy Act are
quoted and discussed.
na It could be argued that instead of a lien the buyer receives a limited title interest,
but this argument has little chance of success.
120 See, e.g., section 60a(6), 11 U.S.C. 4 96(a) (6) (1964).
121 See P. 52 supra.
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ceasing to pay debts as they became due is the only one appropriate
for section 2-502. It was also suggested above that section 2-502 can be
interpreted as giving a buyer the right to recover if he advances the
price after the insolvency of the seller. If either of these interpretations
were accepted, the buyer's right to recover cannot be deemed to arise
on the insolvency of the seller.
Since the third and fourth requirements present alternatives, it
is necessary to summarize to determine the trustee's chance of meet-
ing one of the buyer's theories. The trustee may be able to show that
a subsequent good faith purchaser can defeat the buyer's rights under
sections 2-716 and 2-502. As discussed' above, the trustee must argue by
analogy and, in view of the possible alternatives, one can only specu-
late on the outcome. If the buyer is claiming under section 2-502, the
trustee has a strong alternative claim that the buyer's right arises on
the seller's insolvency. The chance of success here depends on whether
the trustee's claim is stronger if the buyer is attempting to recover under
section 2-502 and whether a court could go either way on the questions
involved regardless of the theory under which the buyer proceeded.
The second requirement, that the buyer's rights arise solely by
force of statute, creates problems for the trustee. Since the section
2-716(3) right to replevin and the section 2-502 right to recovery on
the seller's insolvency have common law antecedents, it is necessary to
analyze these antecedents to determine how much of a change has been
effected by the Code.
At common law, the buyer could recover the goods from the seller
if the buyer had "property" in the goods, a concept not meaningfully
distinguishable from title, as the term is now used in the Code.'
Under the Sales Act, the buyer's rights similarly depended on his having
"property" in the goods!" This property was acquired by the buyer
when the seller appropriated the goods to the contract with the assent
of the buyer.124
When the Code is placed in context with the common law and the
Sales Act a progression can be seen. The Code limits the buyer's ability
to recover the goods to two specific instances: (1) replevin where cover
cannot be obtained and (2) recovery where the seller is insolvent. On
the other hand, the Code extends the availability of these rights to situ-
ations where only identification is present. This extension does not
produce results much different from those under the Sales Act since the
special property interest received on identification under the Code is
3:111 See SW. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 351-60 (5th ed. 1942). "Property"
in goods originally meant only a superior right to possession, but grew to mean owner-
ship or title.
123 U.S.A. §§ 66, 67.
121 U.S.A. § 18.
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not greatly different from the "property" under the Sales Act. The Code
and the Sales Act represent significant steps beyond the common law,
however, since identification may occur long before title is passed."'
The trustee's burden under section 67 must be to show that the ex-
tension of previous rights by sections 2-716(3) and 2-502 is so great
that the Code rights are, in effect, new rights. This is the same burden
that he had in showing that the seller's right to reclaim is a statutory
lien. Here, however, the trustee should have more success. The words
used in section 67 are "solely by force of statute." Therefore, the Code
must be compared to the common law, not the Sales Act when they are
evaluated under this test.
The rights of the buyer under the Code are wholly different from
those under the common law. Where replevin was a right based on title,
title is no longer relevant. Also, common law replevin is a right avail-
able whenever the buyer has title. The buyer's rights under sections
2-716(3) and 2-502 are limited to specific situations. In summary, the
Code's rights are better typed as rights created by statute, not exten-
sions of rights created by common law.
There are two reasons, however, why the trustee's position is not
as strong as it appears above. First, Sales Act replevin actions have been
held to be allowable against the trustee in bankruptcy."° Since the
replevin under the Sales Act is not vastly different from replevin or
recovery under the Code, these decisions appear to support the validity
of the buyer's claim against the trustee.
The second reason is that the policy of the Bankruptcy Act seems
more consistent with upholding the right to replevin or recovery upon
insolvency against the trustee. The definition of statutory lien con-
tained in Section 1(29a) of the Bankruptcy Act specifically excludes
security interests whether or not such security interests arise as a
result of statutory provisions. Thus, it was not intended that all liens
that are derived from statutes should be invalidated even though these
liens may arise on the insolvency of the debtor or be subject to de-
f easance by a bona fide purchaser.'"
The buyer's "special property interest" that is the requisite of a
right of recovery is very much like a security interest. It is created by
the making of the contract of sale and the identification of the goods
to the contract. This process is analogous to that involved in the crea-
tion of a security interest: the making of a security agreement and the
debtor's acquiring rights in the collateral. From the "special property
125 See U.C.C. § 2-501 for the rules that dictate when identification occurs.
125 See In re American Boiler Works, Inc., 220 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1955) ; In re
Shipley Stave 8: Lumber Co., 29 F. Supp. 746 (ED. Ky. 1939).
127 Under Article 9, a security interest may be perfected against lien creditors but
not against a buyer in the ordinary course of business, U.C.C. § 9-3070), or a buyer "for
his own personal, family or household purposes...." U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
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interest" the buyer acquires the right to obtain possession of the goods
in certain instances. Similarly, a security interest gives the secured
party a right to the collateral for satisfaction of an underlying debt.
If the Bankruptcy Act recognizes the validity of the security interest
in bankruptcy, it should also recognize the existence of the buyer's
"special property interest" and the rights that flow from it. One does
not subvert the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act any more than the
other.
In view of the above objectives of allowing the trustee to use the
statutory lien provisions of the Bankruptcy Act to defeat the buyer's
attempt to recover the goods, it is doubtful that the trustee should pre-
vail. In addition, even if a court were to ignore the countervailing policy
considerations, it would be difficult for it to find that the trustee has
shown that the buyer's rights fall within one of the two alternative tests:
(1) that they can be defeated by a bona fide purchaser or (2) that they
arise on the insolvency of the seller. Therefore, it would seem that sec-
tion 67(c) provides no bar to the buyer's recovering the goods from the
trustee.
The trustee's rights under Section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act' to
set aside preferential transfers presents in certain situations a more for-
midable obstacle for the buyer who is attempting to recover the goods.
A preference is defined in section 60a(1) as a transfer of property
(1) from the debtor to the creditor; (2) for or on account of an ante-
cedent debt; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) within
four months of bankruptcy if (5) the effect of the transfer is to give the
creditor a greater percentage of his debt than other creditors of the same
class. (The numbers are added to separate the remiirements and to sim-
plify the discussions.) In regard to personal property, section 60a(2)
defines "transfer" as used in section 60a(1) as taking place at the time
when the property interest in the transferee becomes so far perfected that
it cannot be defeated by a contract lien, either equitable or legal. The term
"perfection" in section 60a(2) is limited by the provision in section
60a(6) that a transfer which creates an equitable lien in certain situ-
ations can never be "perfected" even if it is valid against a lien creditor.
Under section 60b, the trustee may set aside a preference if the cred-
itor receiving it had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent
at the time of the transfer.
Some of the above requirements of a preference will determine
whether the buyer's right to replevin and recovery on insolvency can
ever be preferential transfers, whereas others only determine under
what circumstances those rights are preferences. This discussion will
first treat the former requirements and then, assuming it is determined
128 11 U.S.C. 96(b) (1964).
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that the trustee can ever defeat the buyer, the discussion will go on
to the latter requirements to determine the scope of the trustee's
power. The requirements in the first category are: (1) there must be a
debtor-creditor relationship; (2) there must be an antecedent debt;
(3) the effect of the transfer must be to give to the creditor a greater
percentage of his debt than other creditors of the same class.
Before discussion of these requirements, it is necessary to set the
stage. A preference is a transfer of property. In the case of the buyer's
right to replevin or recovery on the insolvency of the debtor, the
property is the special property interest which the buyer receives upon
identification of the goods to the contract, for that is the property in-
terest upon which the buyer's rights are based. In the normal situation,
the transfer, if it occurs at all, occurs upon identification, not only be-
cause the property interest arises at that time, but also because that is
the time at which the section 60a(2) requirement that the property
interest be perfected against a lien creditor is met.' If section 60 ap-
plies at all to the buyer's rights, it will be within this framework.
The first requirement, that a debtor-creditor relationship exist, raises
considerable difficulty because those terms are in no way defined. There
have been two decisions, one involving the common law'"° and the other
the Sales Act, 131 on the question of whether the relationship between
the buyer attempting to recover the goods and his seller is that of cred-
itor and debtor. In both, it was held that the relationship was that of a
vendor and vendee and, therefore, that the statute did not apply.
There must be some doubt as to the correctness of these decisions,
however. There is certainly no clear-cut line between a vendor-vendee
relationship and a debtor-creditor relationship. In fact, they appear to
be wholly different generic classifications. When a seller delivers goods
to a buyer, the buyer becomes obligated to pay the price. The fact that
the buyer is a vendee does not mean that he is not a debtor, nor is the
vendor any less a creditor. It would seem, therefore, that the reasoning
of the two cases is faulty.' In the case of the buyer's right to replevin
or recovery on the insolvency of the seller, the mere fact that the buyer
has a lien to secure receipt of the goods makes him a creditor and the
seller a debtor.
The second requirement, that the transfer be on behalf of an ante-
cedent debt, also raises substantial problems of interpretation. Two
types of situations may arise which will create different problems. The
129 	§ 2-502 (2).
130 Templeton v. Kehler, 173 F. 575 (ED. Pa. 1909).
131 In re Shipley Stave & Lumber Co., 29 F. Supp. 746, 749 (ED. Ky. 1939).
132 See Hurley v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 213 U.S. 126 (1909), cited as authority
in In re Shipley Stave and Lumber Co., 29 F. Supp. 746, 749 (ED. Ky. 1939). It is diffi-
cult to see how this case stands for that proposition at all. For a proper application of
Hurley see Gage Lumber Co. v. McEldowney, 207 F. 255 (6th Cir. 1913).
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first occurs where the goods are in existence at the time of the making
of the contract and identification occurs immediately. The second arises
where identification does not occur at the time of the making of the
contract. In the first instance, it would seem that since the transfer
occurs at the time of the making of the contract there can be no ante-
cedent debt. All relevant events happen simultaneously.
Although this conclusion is no doubt accurate, it is subject to one
objection that must be considered. Although transfer, as defined in
section 60a(2), occurs when the creditor's interest becomes perfected
against a lien creditor, there is an exception to this rule in certain situ-
ations where an equitable lien is involved. Therefore, the holder of an
equitable lien has often had no transfer at all. Allowing him to enforce
his interest, however, would complete the transfer and this would be a
preference. Thus, the holder of an equitable lien, if he comes within
section 60a(6), cannot assert his claim against the trustee.
Since the term "equitable lien" is largely undefined's' it is possible
that the buyer's rights could be placed in this category."' This view
will not defeat the buyer's rights, however, because of the additional
requirements of section 60a(6). The section strikes down such liens
only where means of perfecting a legal lien are available. Whatever the
interest of a buyer is termed, he has no method of further perfection
other than obtaining possession. His ability to obtain possession is
not in reality a means of further perfection since his lien is securing the
receipt of possession."' Thus section 60a(6) cannot apply in this
instance.
The second situation, where the buyer obtains his "special property
interest" after contract formation presents greater problems. If the
"debt" arises at the time of the contract, the transfer which occurs on
identification is on account of an antecedent debt. If the debt arises
at the time of the transfer, there is, of course, no antecedent debt situ-
ation. The former conclusion is more likely. All consensual elements
have taken place and the seller has assumed the obligation to deliver
the goods. The "transfer" merely secures that obligation.
133 See Caldwell v. Armstrong, 342 F.2d 485, 490 (10th Cir. 1965), for an attempt
at a definition. See also Countryman, The Secured Transactions Article of the Com-
mercial Code and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 76, 96-98
(1951), for a discussion of possible equitable liens under Article 9. The author has been
unable to find any cases in which a right given directly by statute was called an equi-
table lien.
134 Kennedy has come the closest in calling it a security interest perfected without
filing. See Kennedy, supra note 44, at 557-58.
135 See Porter v. Searle, 228 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1955) ; United Pac. Ins. Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 222 F. Supp. 243 (D. Ore. 1963); Cumberland Portland Cement Co. v.
Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 739 (ED. Tenn. 1953), aff'd, 232 F.2d 930 (6th
Cir. 1956) ; Danai v. De Matter) Constr. Co., 102 F. Supp. 874 (D.N.H. 1952). See also
Caldwell v. Armstrong, 342 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1965); Note, 69 Harv, L. Rev. 1492
(1956).
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The last requirement, the increase in the creditor's share, is ful-
filled and needs little explanation. Without the right to recover the
goods the buyer is, at best, a general creditor.
In view of the above discussion, it would appear that the trustee
may in some circumstances defeat the buyer as long as identification
occurs subsequent to the formation of the contract for sale. Of course,
the utility of the argument for the trustee depends on his establishing
the following circumstances: (1) the transfer occurred within four
months of bankruptcy; (2) the debtor was insolvent at the time of
the transfer; and (3) the creditor knew of the debtor's insolvency at
the time of the transfer. In the normal transaction, the trustee will be
able to establish the existence of the first two requirements, but only on
rare occasions would he be likely to establish the existence of the latter
requirement. Since the transfer occurs on identification, identification
will probably occur before the buyer learns of the seller's insolvency.
Even if the buyer learns of the seller's insolvency before the date of
identification, it will be a difficult fact for the trustee to prove. Because
of this difficulty it is unlikely that trustees will find section 60 an ef-
fective weapon.
IV. THE RIGHT TO GOODS IN TRANSIT
A. Seller
The right of a seller, who has put goods in the hands of a carrier
for delivery to the buyer, to regain possession of those goods is set out
explicitly in sections 2-702 and 2-705 of the Code. Generally, the seller
may stop delivery where (1) he discovers that the buyer is insolvent,
(2) the buyer repudiates or fails to make payment or (3) the seller
has a right to withhold or reclaim the goods!"
These rights are not absolute, however. Not only must the goods
still be in the possession of the carrier when the seller attempts to re-
gain possession, but also the buyer must not have received notification
from a bailee that he holds the goods. In addition, specific provisions
for notice to the carrier are set out in section 2-705. Sections 2-702 and
2-705 relate only to the rights of the seller against the carrier. Once
the goods get into the hands of the buyer, the seller must derive his
rights from other sections.
B. Buyer
The buyer's right to obtain possession of goods held by a carrier
falls within the general provisions regarding the buyer's right to re-
plevin. Specifically, section 2-716 provides that the buyer has a right
to replevin where "the goods have been shipped under reservation, and
136 The Uniform Sales Act contained similar provisions. See U.S.A. ¢§ 53, 54.
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satisfaction of the security interest in them has been made or tendered."
From this language it can be inferred that replevin is the proper remedy
where the seller does not hold a security interest in the goods and the
interest to be acquired by the buyer is absolute.
As discussed above, at common law, the right to replevin was de-
pendent upon title. This requirement is not present in the Code. In its
place, the Code requires that the buyer have a special property interest
that comes with identification of the goods to the contract. Since in
the normal sales transaction, identification occurs before the seller puts
the goods in the hands of the carrier, the buyer will almost always have
the right to replevy the goods from the carrier.
Because the buyer's right to replevin is so expansive, there is a
great possibility that it will come in conflict with the seller's right to
stop the goods in transit. There is no doubt that if the seller is rightfully
attempting to acquire the goods pursuant to section 2-705, he will pre-
vail since his claim is enforceable against the buyer. On the other hand,
if the seller is wrongfully attempting to regain possession, he cannot
prevail.
The problem becomes more complex, however, when the seller
wrongfully stops the goods in transit and diverts them to another buyer
or to a lien creditor. The rights of the buyer in this situation are identi-
cal to those discussed above where the seller has never put the goods in
the hands of the carrier and no further discussion is needed here." 7
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has attempted to treat the right of each
of the parties in a sales transaction to obtain possession of the goods
when they are in the hands either of the other party to the sale, or of
a carrier. In spite of the proclamations of the drafters of the Code to
the contrary, it is clear that some areas must be filled in with common
law principles and concepts.'" It is also apparent that the use of title
to determine rights and remedies is not dead. In some situations, such
as those covered by section 2-403 (1), the Code makes title controlling.
In the many other situations where the Code provides no solutions, the
courts will, in most cases, fall back on title to fashion a solution.'"
137 For a statement of the prior law see Adkins v. Damron, 324 S.W.2d 489 (Ky.
1959).
138 See Vold, Construing the Uniform Commercial Code: Its Own Twin Keys: Uni-
formity and Growth, 50 Cornell L.Q. 49, 62 (1964).
139 For lack of any other method, the conclusions with regard to title are often
based on negative inference. It is felt, however, that such inferences are proper in the
particular circumstances in which they are used. See, e.g., Skilton, Some Comments on
the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 597, 619.
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